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Abstract
We consider the problem of designing a survey to aggregate non-verifiable information from a
privacy-sensitive population: an analyst wants to compute some aggregate statistic from the private bits
held by each member of a population, but cannot verify the correctness of the bits reported by partici-
pants in his survey. Individuals in the population are strategic agents with a cost for privacy, i.e., they not
only account for the payments they expect to receive from the mechanism, but also their privacy costs
from any information revealed about them by the mechanism’s outcome—the computed statistic as well
as the payments—to determine their utilities. How can the analyst design payments to obtain an accurate
estimate of the population statistic when individuals strategically decide both whether to participate and
whether to truthfully report their sensitive information?
We design a differentially private peer-prediction mechanism [MRZ05] that supports accurate es-
timation of the population statistic as a Bayes-Nash equilibrium in settings where agents have explicit
preferences for privacy. The mechanism requires knowledge of the marginal prior distribution on bits
bi, but does not need full knowledge of the marginal distribution on the costs ci, instead requiring only
an approximate upper bound. Our mechanism guarantees ǫ-differential privacy to each agent i against
any adversary who can observe the statistical estimate output by the mechanism, as well as the payments
made to the n − 1 other agents j 6= i. Finally, we show that with slightly more structured assumptions
on the privacy cost functions of each agent [CCK+13], the cost of running the survey goes to 0 as the
number of agents diverges.
1 Introduction
Consider the problem faced by a researcher who would like to compute some (unknown) statistic about a
target population: for example, the prevalence of AIDS among university professors. He could, of course,
run a survey and ‘just ask’; the obstacle he faces is that an individual’s AIDS status is sensitive data, and the
individuals being surveyed may be concerned that some harm might befall them if they were to participate
in such a survey. This is a problem for the researcher, since individuals are not obligated to participate
in his survey—to solve this problem, he might offer a (possibly different) payment to each participant to
compensate them for such concerns and offset their ‘privacy’ costs from participating in his survey. The
researcher still has a problem, though—even if he manages to recruit individuals to participate in his survey
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(for instance, incentivized by the payment offered for participation), these participants are still not obligated
to truthfully report their private data, nor does our researcher have any direct means to verify the truth of
their responses.
The “sensitive surveyor’s problem” [GR13] attempts to model the problem of procuring data from indi-
viduals, each with a cost of privacy, in order to estimate some aggregate statistic of a population, and has
since been studied in some depth [GR13, FL12, RS12, LR12, GL13, NVX14]. This stream of work, how-
ever, has thus far only modeled settings in which the data collected from each participant are verifiable, and
the only information that a participant can misreport is her privacy cost determining the compensation she
requires for participation—that is, an individual may choose to not participate in the survey, but if partici-
pating, she cannot lie about her data.1 As evident from our cartoon AIDS survey example, however, there
are clearly also scenarios where a researcher cannot directly verify the truth of the responses to his survey.
A researcher in such a scenario faces an additional problem in computing a reliable estimate of an aggregate
statistic beyond cheaply eliciting participation—recruiting a large enough population of respondents does
not automatically lead to representative estimates because individuals may still lie about their data, com-
promising the accuracy of the estimate. How can payments be designed to ensure that the survey produces
an accurate estimate of the population statistic, when individuals strategically decide both whether or not to
participate and whether or not to truthfully report their sensitive data, accounting both for the payments they
expect to receive from the mechanism and their privacy costs from the mechanism’s outcome?
The problem of eliciting unverifiable2 information from strategic agents is addressed by the peer predic-
tion mechanism [MRZ05], which uses proper scoring rules to design payments such that truthful reporting is
a (Bayes)-Nash equilibrium of the mechanism. Agents in [MRZ05], however, have no concern for privacy—
they do not care about what the outcomes computed by the mechanism might reveal about their reports,
and act only to maximize their expected payment from the mechanism. The peer-prediction mechanism,
therefore, does not directly address the following problem of eliciting information from privacy-sensitive
individuals.
Consider an abstract model of such a privacy-sensitive population: each agent in the population has
a private (sensitive) bit bi, as well as a parameter ci which bounds her cost for privacy as follows. If the
mechanism that agents interact with is ǫ-differentially private [DMNS06], then an agent’s cost (which is po-
tentially distinct for each outcome) is at most, though not necessarily exactly, ǫci. The bit-cost pairs (bi, ci)
for each individual are drawn from a (not necessarily independent) commonly known prior distribution.
Implementing a peer prediction mechanism in such a setting faces two main obstacles:
1. The way that the peer prediction mechanism incentivizes truth-telling despite unverifiability is by
rewarding a participant’s stated bit’s correlation with that of another participant. A participating agent
i in the peer prediction mechanism of [MRZ05] is paired with a uniformly randomly selected agent j,
and paid as a deterministic function of her own reported bit bˆi, as well as the reported bit bˆj of agent j.
Such a payment rule is inherently disclosive;3 for the payments to satisfy differential privacy, we must
instead base them on perturbed aggregates of all players’ reports. Relatedly, if the privacy costs ci
are drawn from a distribution with unbounded support, no finite level of payment will encourage full
participation with truthful reporting, in contrast to [MRZ05]. Hence, the derivation of Bayes-Nash
equilibrium conditions is more delicate: we require players to be strictly incentivized to report their
1For instance, her data will be automatically collected from some database once she consents to its use, or equivalently, false
reports can easily be identified, in which case not compensating individuals for false reports effectively eliminates the incentive to
participate and yet lie about the sensitive data.
2i.e., where agents’ reports cannot be compared against some ground truth for verification
3since it is computed deterministically as a function of the reported bit of a single individual j
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true bit, which can be interpreted as a prediction of the average value of all other reported bits, but
this incentive must be robust to the noise that is explicitly added to the computed aggregate (which
determines the payment) in order to preserve privacy, as well as to the error in the estimate from lack
of full participation.
2. As mentioned above, in order to guarantee differential privacy, we require that the output (and pay-
ments) we compute be perturbed, which introduces error in our estimate of the statistic that we wish to
compute. To obtain some fixed level of accuracy, therefore, we must deal with a tradeoff: on the one
hand, increasing the perturbation rate directly decreases accuracy by virtue of the noise we add. On
the other hand, it increases privacy, which can in turn increase participation, which increases accuracy.
In order to find an equilibrium that matches our accuracy goals, we must manage this tradeoff.
In this paper, we give a differentially private peer prediction mechanism that supports the accurate
estimation of a population statistic as a Bayes Nash equilibrium, even in settings where agents have explicit
preferences for privacy. Our mechanism, which guarantees ǫ-differential privacy to each agent i against any
adversary who can observe the statistical estimate output by the mechanism as well as the payments made to
the n−1 other agents j 6= i (but not the payment made to agent i,4) requires knowledge of the marginal prior
distribution on bits bi, but need only know a crude upper bound on the marginal distribution on costs ci. We
show that with a slightly more specific assumption about agent privacy costs [CCK+13], the mechanism’s
total cost of compensating players for their privacy goes to zero as the number of agents diverges, while
supporting accurate estimation of the statistic in equilibrium.
1.1 Related Work
There are two main strands of related work: that in the “sensitive surveys” literature, and that in the peer
prediction literature.
1.1.1 Privacy Aware Surveys
The problem of estimating a population statistic among strategic agents who have explicit costs for privacy
was introduced by Ghosh and Roth [GR13], who considered the problem of designing a prior-free direct
revelation mechanism for this task. They considered two settings: one in which agents’ costs ci can be
correlated with their private bits bi (and hence the costs themselves can potentially be disclosive, and com-
putations on them can harm privacy), and another in which agents’ costs are independent from their private
bits (or at least agents do not regard themselves as experiencing privacy costs due to computations done
only on their reported ci values). In the first (more interesting) model, [GR13] prove an impossibility re-
sult, showing that no individually rational mechanism that makes finite payments can achieve a non-trivial
estimate of the underlying population statistic. In the second (less realistic) model, [GR13] give dominant
strategy truthful mechanisms for either a) producing a statistic to some target accuracy α, with optimal
payments relative to an envy-free benchmark, or b) producing a maximally accurate statistic given a fixed
payment budget.
4We assume that the surveyor is trusted, and that agents are concerned about maintaining privacy from the other people in the
survey, as well as from external observers of the survey outcome. We think of payments made to a particular agent as confidential,
so that an outside observer, together with a coalition of survey participants, could in the worst case learn the outcome of the survey,
as well as the payments made to all players j 6= i, and use these to form inferences about agent i’s private data. (Note that if the
adversary could see the payment made to agent i, then it is not hard to see that almost nothing can be done to preserve privacy:
observing the payment of player i reveals that her cost for participating is lower than the payment, which is a violation of differential
privacy (of the costs)).
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Much of the subsequent work has focused on circumventing and extending the impossibility result that
[GR13] prove in the setting in which agents’ bits and costs are correlated. Fleischer and Lyu [FL12] consider
a Bayesian setting in which there are two known prior distributions on costs, D0 and D1. Agents with bi = 1
have their cost drawn from D1, and agents with bi = 0 have their costs drawn from D0. The mechanism
knows the priors, but does not know the proportion of individuals with bi = 1. [FL12] give a clever
contracting scheme that makes the distribution on agent participation decisions independent of their bit, and
from this argue that they can incentivize agent participation even in the presence of correlations between
bits and costs. This mechanism, however, does require that these priors be known exactly to the mechanism:
both the privacy guarantee and the truthfulness guarantee depend on the accuracy of these priors.
Ligett and Roth [LR12] in contrast give a model in which the impossibility result of [GR13] is circum-
vented by relaxing the individual rationality requirement. In this model, the mechanism has the power to
observe non-participation decisions—which, when costs and bits are correlated, can result in privacy loss
for the non-participating agents. However, [LR12] only require that the mechanism make (individually
rational) payments to participating agents, and not to non-participating ones.
Most recently, an elegant paper of Nissim, Vadhan, and Xiao [NVX14] revisits this problem and offers
two results. First, they significantly strengthen the impossibility result of [GR13] to hold under a much
weaker set of assumptions. Second, they circumvent the impossibility result by making the natural assump-
tion that agent costs are positively correlated with their bit: that is, they make the assumption that there is a
clear “more sensitive” bit value, such that an agent whose bit flips from bi = 0 to bi = 1 will only have a
higher, and never lower cost for privacy. By promising privacy only for agents that have this property, they
are able to circumvent the impossibility theorem.
Common to all these papers (which are surveyed in [PR13], along with a broader set of work on the
intersection of privacy and mechanism design) is the assumption that agent bits bi are verifiable, and that
agents only have the ability to misreport their costs ci. This represents the main departure of the present
paper from previous work on the sensitive surveyor’s problem: we allow agents to mis-report their bit bi.
1.1.2 Privacy Cost Functions
Any work that seeks to model strategic agents in the presence of privacy concerns must grapple with the
problem of how to model agents’ costs for privacy. Differential privacy, introduced by Dwork, McSherry,
Nissim, and Smith [DMNS06] provides a formal measure which gives a linear upper bound on the degree
to which an agent can decrease his expected future utility via his decision to participate in a mechanism
(see [GR13] for further discussion of this). [GR13] use a model that assumes agent costs are exactly linear:
that they experience cost ciǫ for some ci when their data are used in an ǫ-differentially private way. Nissim,
Orlandi, and Smorodinsky [NOS12] propose assuming that agents’ privacy costs can be arbitrary, but upper
bounded by some linear cost ciǫ. This is the most general assumption in the literature, and the one that we
adopt for most of our paper.
Chen et al. [CCK+13] propose and justify an outcome-based measure (also based on differential privacy)
which usually results in much lower (sublinear) costs, which have several nice analytic properties. We also
adopt this model in Section 3.4 as an alternative (and relaxed) definition of privacy.
1.1.3 Peer Prediction
The peer-prediction method, introduced by Miller, Resnick and Zeckhauser [MRZ05], is a mechanism
for truthfully eliciting information from agents in the absence of a verifiable ground truth against which
to compare agents’ reports. The mechanism in [MRZ05] uses proper scoring rules to reward agents for
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making reports that are predictive of other agents’ reports, to ensure that truthtelling is a Nash equilib-
rium. There has since been a stream of work on several variants of the original peer-prediction model,
motivated by opinion elicitation in online settings such as reviews and reputations where there is no ob-
jective ground truth [JF06, JF07, JF09, WP11, WP12b]. The Bayesian Truth Serum (BTS) mechanism
and its variants [Pre04, WP12a] use a different technique for eliciting truthful reports of unverifiable in-
formation that do not require the assumption of a common prior. Finally, there is also work focused ex-
plicitly on incentive-compatible mechanisms for surveying a population to acquire an estimate of some
statistic [LS08, JF08, GRP09, PRGJ11]. The papers amongst these that are closest to our problem are
perhaps [JF06], which uses automated mechanism design to minimize the budget required by an incentive-
compatible information elicitation mechanism, albeit in a setting with equal participation costs, and [GRP09]
which presents a truthful, weighted, budget-balanced mechanism for collective revelation.
This information elicitation literature, however, studies models that differ fundamentally from our setting
in that agents derive utility only from the payment they receive from the mechanism, and not from any use of
the reported information itself. Specifically, this literature thus far has focused, to the best of our knowledge,
entirely on settings where agents do not derive any (dis)utility from any outputs computed from the reports
made to the mechanism, unlike in our setting with privacy costs (where the outputs are the payments made
to (other) agents, and the aggregate statistic computed by the analyst). Also, agents’ participation costs in
this literature (which in fact has largely assumed equal participation costs for all agents) do not relate to the
(private) information the surveyor wishes to elicit from them. These two differences between our setting
with a privacy sensitive population and the models in the information elicitation literature significantly alter
both the incentives that need to be provided for truthful reporting, as well as the tradeoffs between the total
cost incurred by the mechanism and the accuracy of its output.
2 Model
We now present a model for the problem of designing a survey to accurately aggregate non-verifiable infor-
mation from a population of privacy-sensitive agents, each of whom strategically chooses whether or not to
participate, and whether or not to truthfully report her private bit to the survey.
Agents. There are n agents in the population, each with a private bit bi ∈ {0, 1} of interest to an analyst,
and a private cost coefficient ci that characterizes the agent’s disutility from any privacy loss from the survey.
The vector of bit-cost pairs (b, c) = [(b1, c1), . . . , (bn, cn)] describing the population of n agents is drawn
from a known joint distribution P over {0, 1}n × Rn≥0; since the prior P is a joint distribution over bit-cost
pairs, this model allows for agents to have privacy costs ci that are correlated with their sensitive private
bit bi. (We note that the mechanisms studied in this paper elicit agents’ bits, but do not ever require reports
of the costs—the privacy costs are only used by agents in their own utility calculations to determine their
optimal action trading off the costs and benefits of participation and truthful reporting.)
We make two assumptions about the joint distribution P. (i) We assume that P is symmetric over agents,
in that all agents are ‘equal’ in terms of what bit-cost pair they may draw. Formally, for every permutation
σ and every b ∈ {0, 1}n, c ∈ Rn≥0, we have PrP [(b, c)] = PrP [σ((b, c))], i.e., all permutations of a given
bit-cost vector describing the population are equally likely.5 (ii) Second, we assume that an agent’s cost ci
does not give her any information about other agents, beyond what is already conveyed to her by her own bit
bi. Formally, the posterior distribution on other agents’ bits b−i and costs c−i that any agent i can compute
5Of course, note that this does not mean that all individual bit-cost pairs are equally likely; it only says that all agents are equally
likely to have a particular pair.
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after observing his own type (bi, ci) is conditionally independent of ci given bi: for every bi, b−i, ci, c′i, c−i,
Pr[b−i|bi, ci] = Pr[b−i|bi, c
′
i]. This is a natural condition that can be satisfied in a number of ways—for
example, it is satisfied if agents first draw a bit bi from an underlying distribution on bits, and then draw
their cost from a distribution parameterized by bi, as in the model considered by [FL12].
Since an agent’s cost, conditional on her bit, does not affect the distribution of remaining agents’ bits,
and since agents are symmetric, the distribution over the n− 1 remaining draws of private bits b−i given the
draw of bi does not depend either on the identity i of the agent who made the draw, nor on her cost ci. We
will use the following notation for these common posterior distributions.
Definition 2.1. [P0,P1,B,B0,B1, C, C0, C1.] Consider a priorP over the n-vector of bit-cost pairs [(bi, ci)].
We denote the conditional joint distribution of the vector (b, c)−i ∈ ({0, 1} × R)n−1 conditioned on bi = 0
by P0 and that conditioned on bi = 1 by P1. We denote the marginal distribution of P (and P0 and P1) on
the bits as B (and B0 and B1) and the marginal distribution of the costs as C (and C0 and C1)
Mechanisms. There is an analyst who would like to acquire each agent’s private bit bi in order to
perform some computation on it. The analyst uses a mechanism M to transform the set of bits bˆi reported by
participating agents into an outcome o; in exchange, the mechanism can make payments πi to the agents for
their reports. Formally, a mechanism is a randomized mapping M : {0, 1}n → O×Rn≥0, taking as input the
vector of reported bits bˆi ∈ {0, 1,⊥} (where ⊥ represents the decision to decline to provide one’s bits), and
produces an output M(bˆ) = (o, π) where o ∈ O is a publicly observed outcome in some abstract outcome
space O, and π ∈ Rn≥0 is a vector of payments. We will think of the analyst as interested in computing
the fraction of the population that has bi = 1, so that the mechanisms we design will have outcome space
O = [0, 1] ⊆ R.
Unlike in prior literature, we do not assume that the bits bi are verifiable by the analyst. In our setting,
in addition to declining to provide their bit to the mechanism, agents can lie about their private bits bi, and
will do so if it improves their utilities, which we describe next.
Agent utilities. An agent’s utility is the difference between the payment πi she receives from the analyst,
and the cost she incurs from privacy losses from the outcome of the mechanism, modeled as follows.
Each agent in the population is concerned about privacy, in the sense of what might be revealed about her
sensitive bit bi by information that becomes available to others as a result of the survey. This includes both
the publicly released outcome o, as well as the payments π−i made to the other agents by the mechanism;
we assume, however, that the payment πi made to player i is unobservable to anyone other than player i. We
note that this is the strongest privacy model possible, as it is easy to see that if an adversary can see player
i’s payment, then no mechanism can be both finitely differentially private and truthful in our setting. We
measure privacy loss in our setting using a variant of differential privacy [DMNS06] called joint-differential
privacy, introduced by [KPRU14]:
Definition 2.2 (Joint Differential Privacy). Let M(b)−i = (o, π−i) denote the portion of the mechanism’s
output that is observable to outside observers and agents j 6= i. A mechanism M : {0, 1}n → O×Rn≥0 is ǫ-
jointly differentially private if for every vector of bits bˆ ∈ {0, 1}n for every player i, for each bit bˆ′i ∈ {0, 1},
and for every observable set of outcomes S ⊆ O × Rn−1≥0 :
Pr[M(bˆ)−i ∈ S] ≤ exp(ǫ) Pr[M(bˆ
′
i, bˆ−i)−i ∈ S.]
Note that the standard notion of differential privacy would require that a unilateral deviation by a single
player i would result in only a small change in the distribution over outcomes o as well as payment vectors
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π, including player i’s own payment πi – meaning that each player would be paid roughly the same amount,
no matter what bit they report! Such a mechanism clearly cannot incentivize truthful reporting of one’s bits.
Joint differential privacy relaxes this constraint, and insists only that the joint distribution over the outcome
o and the payments π−i made to all players j 6= i be insensitive to the report of player i. Crucially, πi can
depend on player i’s report in an arbitrary way.
Following Nissim, Orlandi, and Tennenholtz [NOS12], we model agents as having costs for privacy
vi(M,o, π−i) that can be arbitrary functions of the mechanism and the output. However, we assume that
if the mechanism M is jointly differentially private, the privacy cost to an agent for all possible outcomes
of the mechanism is upper-bounded by a linear function of the level of differential privacy: that is, if M is
ǫ-jointly differentially private, vi(M,o, π−i) ≤ ǫci for all outcomes o, where ci is agent i’s personal cost
coefficient. When it is clear from context, we will simply write v(ǫ, o, π−i) to emphasize that the upper
bound depends on the mechanism M only via the level of joint differential privacy ǫ that M provides, and
not on any other characteristic of the mechanism.
We assume that players are risk neutral, so that a player’s utility for the outcome of a mechanism M that
is ǫ-jointly differentially private is
ui(M(bˆ)) = E[πi]− E[vi(M,o, π−i)] ≥ E[πi]− ǫci
We are interested in survey-like mechanisms that ask each agent to report their private bit. An agent’s
action choices in the mechanisms we consider are whether or not to participate, and what bit bˆi to report
if participating; a strategy for an agent i is a function σi mapping agent type (bi, ci) to an action in bˆi ∈
{0, 1,⊥} (recall that ⊥ represents non-participation). Since we are in an incomplete information setting,
with a known common prior from which agents’ types are drawn, we use the solution concept of a Bayes-
Nash equilibrium.
Definition 2.3. A set of strategies σ1, . . . , σn forms a Bayes-Nash equilibrium if for every player i, for every
realized bit bi and every alternative strategy σ′i:
E(b,c)∼P [ui(M(σ(b, c)))|bi] ≥ E(b,c)∼P [ui(M(σ
′
i(bi, ci), σ−i(b−i, c−i)))|bi].
Note that when we take the expectation over other player’s types b−i, c−i, we condition only on bi, and
not on ci: this is because of our assumption that the posterior distribution is conditionally independent of ci
given bi.
Accuracy. The analyst is interested in computing the fraction of the population that has bi = 1: we use
pˆ = 1n
∑n
i=1 bi to denote this quantity. Since agents in the population each strategically decide whether to
participate and what to report as their bits, the estimate actually computed by the analyst may be different
from pˆ. The analyst’s goal is to design a mechanism such that its outcome closely approximates the true
fraction of agents with bi = 1 in the population, measured formally via its accuracy.
Definition 2.4 (Accuracy.). We say that an output estimate p˜ is α-accurate with respect to the population if
|pˆ− p˜| ≤ α.
We wish to design mechanisms that are α-accurate with high probability in equilibrium—i.e., such that
the estimate p˜ computed by the mechanism, based on the reported bits, from the agents who choose to
participate, is within an additive error α of the true population statistic. Note that a (joint-)differentially
private mechanism M cannot simply return p˜ as the fraction of reports bˆi that are equal to 1, since it must
necessarily perturb this fraction to guarantee privacy.
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3 Private peer-prediction
We now address the problem of conducting sensitive surveys in settings without verifiability: how can an
analyst design payments to ensure an accurate, representative outcome when she cannot verify whether
privacy-sensitive agents honestly report their private information? To do this, we build on the peer pre-
diction mechanism [MRZ05], designed to elicit information from strategic agents when their reports are
unverifiable. The peer prediction mechanism [MRZ05], however, is not differentially private, nor does it
consider agents who have privacy costs or preferences over outcomes. But modifying the peer-prediction
mechanism to be differentially private also modifies the mechanism’s incentive properties, since an agent’s
incentives for truthtelling now depend not only on whether a random reference agent will truthfully report
her bit or not, but also on what fraction of the entire population of (strategic) potential participants enters
the survey and truthfully reports their private information. In this section, we present a differentially private
peer-prediction mechanism, and analyze the incentives of agents with privacy costs in this mechanism.
3.1 Peer Prediction Preliminaries
We begin by introducing some necessary background on scoring rules, which are designed for information
elicitation in settings with verifiable outcomes.
Consider a forecasting setting, where the objective is to gather and aggregate the opinions of a set of
experts about some (observable) future event. There is a large literature on the design of mechanisms—
scoring rules—that reward an expert based on her reported prediction and the observed outcome of the
event so as to incentivize the expert to truthfully reveal her true prediction about the event. Specifically,
suppose there is an single expert who has some private belief about the probability of a random binary
event. A strictly proper scoring rule provides strict incentives to the expert to truthfully report her belief,
i.e., the payment made by such a rule is such that the expert uniquely maximizes her expected payment by
reporting her true belief.
In this paper, we will illustrate our approach to private peer-prediction via a particular strictly proper
scoring rule, the well-known Brier scoring rule [Bri50], which makes payments for predicting a binary
event as follows. Let I be the indicator random variable for the binary event to be predicted, and let q be a
prediction of the probability of the event occurring. The payment for prediction q depends on the realized
outcome I as
BasicBrier(I, q) = 2I · q + 2(1− I) · (1− q)− q2 − (1− q)2,
and it is easy to verify that an expert who believes that I occurs with probability p will maximize her
expected payment (with respect to her belief about the probability of I) by reporting q = p.
The following extension of the basic Brier scoring rule is central to our mechanism.
Definition 3.1 (B(p, q), Bc,d,ρ(p, q)). For any p and q, we define the payment function B(p, q) as follows:
B(p, q) = 1− 2(p − 2p · q + q2).
We also define a rescaling Bc,d,ρ(p, q) of the payment function B(p, q) as follows where ρ > 0:
Bc,d,ρ(p, q) = ρ(B(p − c, q − c)− d).
The definition of B(p, q) has a simple interpretation in terms of the basic Brier scoring rule—B(p, q) is
exactly the expected payment under the basic Brier scoring rule from reporting a guess q for the probability
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of an event, when the expert believes that event I occurs with probability p:
EI∼p[BasicBrier(I, q)] = 2p · q + 2(1 − p) · (1− q)− q
2 − (1− q)2
= 1− 2(p − 2p · q + q2)
= B(p, q).
The need for the modified payment function Bc,d,ρ(p, q) will become clear when we move to discussing
private peer prediction mechanisms. The values of ρ and d simply apply a linear shift to the payoff B(p, q),
while the effect of c is slightly more subtle—we will use it when defining payments in the peer-prediction
mechanism to symmetrize the scoring rule across observations bi = 0 and bi = 1.
The following easy facts about Bc,d,ρ(p, q) will be useful in our equilibrium analysis.
Proposition 3.1. The payment scheme Bc,d,ρ(p, q) has the following properties.
1. For any p, Bc,d,ρ(p, q) is (uniquely) maximized by reporting q = p.
2. Bc,d,ρ(p, q) is Lipschitz-continuous in p: For any p, p′,
|Bc,d,ρ(p, q)−Bc,d,ρ(p
′, q)| ≤ λ|p − p′|, (1)
where λ = |ρ(2− 4(q − c))|.
3. Suppose the value of p is randomly drawn from a distribution with mean E[p]. Then an agent’s
expected payment from reporting q is
Ep[Bc,d,ρ(p, q)] = Bc,d,ρ(E[p], q), (2)
and this payment is maximized by reporting q = E[p].
4. For any p, q,
Bc,d,ρ(p, p)−Bc,d,ρ(p, q) = 2ρ(p − q)
2. (3)
Proof. The first statement follows immediately by setting the derivative of Bc,d,ρ(p, q) with respect to q to
be zero since Bc,d,ρ is strictly concave in q, the second from noting that Bc,d,ρ(p, q) − Bc,d,ρ(p + ǫ, q) =
ρ(2− 4(q − c))ǫ, and the third from noting that B(p, q) is linear in p so that Ep[B(p, q)] = B(E[p], q), and
then applying the first statement. The last statement is obtained by direct substitution:
Bc,d,ρ(p, p)−Bc,d,ρ(p, q) = ρ(1− 2(p − c) + 4(p− c)
2 − 2(p− c)2 − d)
− ρ(1− 2(p − c) + 4(p− c)(q − c)− 2(q − c)2 − d)
= 2ρ(p − q)2.
Peer prediction. In our setting, there is no publicly observable random event or “ground truth” whose out-
come is being predicted by an “expert”. Instead, we only have reports from the agents being surveyed about
their private bits, albeit drawn from a common prior distribution. The key idea behind the peer-prediction
mechanism [MRZ05] designed for such information elicitation problems with unverifiable information is
the following: an agent’s report, instead of being rewarded for its ability to predict an observable event, can
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be rewarded for its success in “predicting” the outcome of the random event consisting of another agent’s
draw of her private bit. Note that the mechanism’s only access to this private bit is via the agent’s report,
which necessitates introducing the notion of equilibrium truthful reporting: since each agent’s payoff, which
depends on the ability of her report to predict another agent’s private bit, depends on that agent’s report, we
cannot just ask what a particular agent will report (as with scoring rules); rather, we must ask what reporting
strategies of the population of agents constitute an equilibrium.
The vector of private bit-cost pairs [(bi, ci)] of the n agents in our population is drawn from a (known)
prior distribution P; recall from Definition 2.1 that P0 (respectively P1) denotes the conditional distribution
of the vector b−i ∈ {0, 1}n−1 conditioned on bi = 0 (respectively bi = 1). Since these distributions B0
and B1 are known (they can be computed from the known prior P), an agent i’s draw of bi can be used to
compute a posterior probability that a random agent j 6= i draws bj = 1. The fact that a particular draw
of bi leads to an updated value for Pr(bj = 1) means that one can ask agents for their bit bi, and use it to
compute their prediction of the probability that bj = 1 using P, instead of asking them to directly report
their prediction of this probability.6 Thus, if agent i reports bi = 0, then the mechanism can translate that
into the prediction p0 = Pr[bj = 1|bi = 0] and if agent i reports bi = 1, then the mechanism can translate
that into the prediction p1 = Pr[bj = 1|bi = 1].
A peer prediction mechanism based on the Brier scoring rule would then pay agent i BasicBrier(bˆj, pbˆi)
where bˆi, and bˆj are the reports of agents i and j respectively. The first claim in Proposition 3.1, applied with
c = d = 0 and ρ = 1, immediately yields that truthful reporting is a Nash equilibrium with these payments:
consider an agent i with reference agent j. If j reports her bit truthfully, i.e., bˆj = bj , then i’s belief about
the probability of j’s report being 1, conditional on her draw, is exactly Pr[bj = 1|bi]. Proposition 3.1(i)
says that i maximizes her payoff in the payment rule BasicBrier by reporting her true belief about this
probability, namely pbi , which corresponds precisely to reporting her true bit bi to the mechanism.
For a peer-prediction mechanism to guarantee differential privacy to agents, however, the mechanism
must introduce a perturbation into the reports that are used to compute other agents’ payments (recall that our
notion of privacy assumes that all payments, except those made to agent i herself, are publicly visible, and
therefore may reveal information about agent i. But such a perturbation will change the quantity that agent
i’s prediction pbˆi is being compared against, and correspondingly her payoffs, and possibly her incentives.
We will therefore need to construct an analog of Proposition 3.1(i) that will allow us to declare that an agent
will do better by truthfully reporting her bit bi than by lying, assuming other agents also report truthfully,
even when the bit he is trying to predict is not actually drawn according to the distribution Pr[bj = 1|bi = 0]
but only a distribution close (enough) to it.
The following proposition creates a peer-prediction mechanism that is resilient to noise, which forms
the basis for designing a differentially private peer-prediction mechanism with truthful reporting in equilib-
rium. The first part of the proposition provides an upper bound on an agent’s payoff from lying about her
bit, assuming all other agents report truthfully, while the second provides a lower bound on the payoff from
truthful reporting, as a function of the magnitude of the noise. Together, these two statements will allow us
to lower-bound the increase in payoff from truthful reporting over lying (assuming other agents report truth-
fully) as a function of how much noise is added to the computation by a differentially private mechanism;
we will then compare these against the improvement in privacy cost from lying to investigate when truthful
reporting constitutes an equilibrium for privacy-sensitive agents, in Theorem 3.2.
6Note that eliciting bi is not, in general, equivalent to eliciting the probability, since the set of strategies available to an agent
facing a scoring rule of the form B(p, q) shrinks when reporting a single bit—while in general an agent could choose to report any
q ∈ [0, 1], asking an agent to report a bit bˆi restricts her to only two possible values of q, p1 or p0, corresponding to the reports of
bˆi = bi and bˆi = 1− bi.
10
Proposition 3.2. Consider a prior P, and let p0, p1 ∈ [0, 1] be the posterior values Pr[bj = 1|bi] corre-
sponding to this prior for bi = 0 and bi = 1 respectively. Let α, β ∈ R be values such that β > 0 and
α < |p1−p0|2 , and set the scale-and-shift parameters c, d, ρ in the modified Brier scoring rule Bc,d,ρ to be
c = (p0 + p1 − 1)/2,
d =
1
2
−
3
2
(p1 − p0)
2 + 2α|p0 − p1|,
ρ =
β
2(p1 − p0)2 − 4α|p0 − p1|
.
Then, (i) ρ > 0, and (ii) the following inequalities hold for each of b ∈ {0, 1}:
1. For any p′ with |p′ − pb| < α, Bc,d,ρ(p′, p1−b) ≤ 0.
2. For any p′ with |p′ − pb| < α, β ≤ Bc,d,ρ(p′, pb).
3. For any α′ > 0, p′ with |p′ − pb| < α′, β + 2ρ(α+ α′)|p0 − p1| ≥ Bc,d,ρ(p′, pb).
Proof. Note that ρ > 0 follows from β > 0 and α < |p1−p0|2 . To prove the next set of inequalities, first note
that B(1/2 + p, 1/2 + q) = B(1/2 − p, 1/2 − q); this can be confirmed by algebraic manipulation. Thus
we have
B(p0 − c, p0 − c) = B
(
1
2
+
p0 − p1
2
,
1
2
+
p0 − p1
2
)
= B
(
1
2
+
p1 − p0
2
,
1
2
+
p1 − p0
2
)
= B(p1 − c, p1 − c),
and similarly
B(p0 − c, p1 − c) = B
(
1
2
+
p0 − p1
2
,
1
2
+
p1 − p0
2
)
= B
(
1
2
+
p1 − p0
2
,
1
2
+
p0 − p1
2
)
= B(p1 − c, p0 − c).
Next, note that for b ∈ {0, 1},
B(pb − c, pb − c) = B
(
1
2
+
pb − pb−1
2
,
1
2
+
pb − pb−1
2
)
=
1
2
+
1
2
(p1 − p0)
2, (4)
where the last equality follows from the definition of B(p, q). Similarly, for b ∈ {0, 1},
B(pb − c, p1−b − c) = B
(
1
2
+
pb − pb−1
2
,
1
2
+
p1−b − pb
2
)
=
1
2
−
3
2
(p1 − p0)
2. (5)
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Next, we compute the expected payoff Bc,d,ρ(pb, pb) to an agent for truthfully her private bit, assuming
all other agents report truthfully, for both possible values of the private bit b ∈ {0, 1}:
Bc,d,ρ(pb, pb) = ρ(B(pb − c, pb − c)− d)
= ρ
(
1
2
+
1
2
(p1 − p0)
2 −
(
1
2
−
3
2
(p1 − p0)
2 + 2α|p0 − p1|
))
= ρ
(
2(p1 − p0)
2 − 2α|p0 − p1|
)
= ρ(2α|p0 − p1|) + ρ
(
2(p1 − p0)
2 − 4α|p0 − p1|
)
= ρ(2α|p0 − p1|) + β. (6)
Similarly, the expected payoff Bc,d,ρ(pb, p1−b) to an agent for lying (i.e., reporting 1 − b when her true
bit is b ∈ {0, 1}) when all other agents report truthfully, is:
Bc,d,ρ(pb, p1−b) = ρ (B(pb − c, p1−b − c)− d)
= ρ
(
1
2
−
3
2
(p1 − p0)
2 −
(
1
2
−
3
2
(p1 − p0)
2 + 2α|p0 − p1|
))
= −ρ(2α|p0 − p1|). (7)
To obtain the first statement (1), which upper-bounds the expected payoff from lying when an agent’s report
is compared against a noisy perturbation of other agents’ true reports, we apply the Lipschitz condition of
Proposition 3.1 Part 1 with λ = |ρ(2−4(pb−c))| = 2ρ|p1−p0| and |q−pb| ≤ α to Equation 7. Similarly, the
second statement (2), which lower-bounds the expected payoff from truthtelling under noise, follows from
applying the same Lipschitz condition to Equation 6. Finally, the third statement (3) follows from applying
Proposition 3.1 part 1 with λ = |ρ(2− 4(pb − c))| = 2ρ|p1 − p0| and |q − pb| ≤ α′ to Equation 6.
3.2 A differentially-private peer prediction mechanism
We now address the question of designing incentives for a survey where privacy-sensitive individuals might
incur disutility from the use of their data in this computation.
For a distribution P over types (b, c), recall that we have defined posterior distributions P0 and P1,
conditioned on a draw of bi = 0 and bi = 1 respectively.
Our mechanism follows. Conceptually, the mechanism asks each agent to report their private bit, which
they have the option of misrepresenting. From their report, the mechanism computes the posterior belief
that is consistent with their report (assuming truthful reporting). It then computes the average value of all
agents’ reports (treating players who have opted not to participate identically as if they reported bˆi = 0),
and perturbs this value so as to guarantee differential privacy. Finally, it pays each agent using our modified
Brier scoring rule, as if they are using the computed posterior distribution to bet on the perturbed average
bit value. The payments are carefully scaled to implement a Bayes Nash equilibrium in which almost all
players choose to report their bit truthfully.
Mechanism MP,n,α,β,ǫ. Consider the following mechanism MP,n,α,β,ǫ for conducting a sensitive survey
with prior P, parameterized by a participation goal 1− α, surplus payment β, and noise parameter ǫ with n
agents.
1. Each participating agent i submits a report bˆi of her private bit.
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2. Set bˆi = 0 for each non-participating agent i.
3. Compute bˆ =
∑n
i=1 bˆi.
4. Perturb bˆ as follows: b¯ = bˆ+ Lap
(
1
ǫ
)
.
5.
p˜ = argmin
x∈[0,1]
∣∣∣∣x− b¯n
∣∣∣∣
p˜−i = argmin
x∈[0,1]
∣∣∣∣∣x− b¯− bˆin− 1
∣∣∣∣∣
6. Compute pbˆi as follows: p0 = EP [p˜−i|bi = 0]; and p1 = EP [p˜−i|bi = 1]. Here, we take the
expectation over the draws of other agents’ bits, assuming they are using the strategy of reporting
their bits truthfully.
7. Next compute c, d, and ρ as functions of p0, p1, α and β as in Proposition 3.2.
8. Pay each participating agent i, πi, based on her report bˆi and p˜−i:
πi = Bc,d,ρ(p˜−i, pbˆi) = ρ(1− 2((p˜−i − c)− 2(p˜−i − c) · (pbˆi − c) + (pbˆi − c)
2)− d).
(Non-participating agents receive no payment.)
9. Output estimate p˜.
3.3 Analyzing MP,n,α,β,ǫ
In this section, we prove that MP,n,α,β,ǫ is an ǫ-joint differentially private mechanism supporting truthful
reporting by a fraction 1− α of agents in equilibrium, and computes an accurate outcome.
We first show in Theorem 3.1 that MP,n,α,β,ǫ is ǫ-jointly differentially private, which follows from
routine arguments and the following lemma.
Lemma 3.1 (“Billboard Lemma” [HHR+13, RR13]). Fix any mechanism M : T n → O, for arbitrary
sets T and O. Fix any function f : T → O′. If M is ǫ-differentially private, then the mechanism M′ :
T n → O × O′n that computes o = M(t) and outputs M′(t) = (o, (f(t1, o), . . . , f(tn, o))) is ǫ-jointly
differentially private.
To prove joint differential privacy, we first observe that the output p˜ of the mechanism observed by
anyone external to the mechanism is ǫ-differentially private, and together with the output, the vector of
payments π is ǫ-jointly differentially private.
Theorem 3.1. MP,n,α,β,ǫ : {0, 1,⊥}n → R≥0 × Rn≥0 is ǫ-jointly differentially private.
Proof. Privacy follows from the fact that bˆ has sensitivity 1, and b¯ is computed using the Laplace mechanism
of [DMNS06] with scale 1/ǫ. From [DMNS06], we know that the computation of b¯ is ǫ-differentially private.
This computation is followed by data independent post-processing to compute p˜, which cannot degrade the
differential privacy guarantee. Finally, payments πi are computed as a function f(bˆi, b¯) = Bc,d,ρ(p˜−i, pbˆi),
as allowed by Lemma 3.1.
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We next prove Theorem 3.2, which addresses the question of accurate estimation of the population statis-
tic in equilibrium by our mechanism MP,n,α,β,ǫ: we will show that there is a threshold strategy equilibrium
in MP,n,α,β,ǫ—where all agents with cost ci below some threshold τ participate and truthfully report their
bits—that has high accuracy; this accuracy, of course, is a function of the parameters of the mechanism.
Recall that P is a joint distribution both over bits b ∈ {0, 1}n and cost vectors c ∈ Rn, and that C
denotes the marginal distribution of P over cost vectors c ∈ Rn. Also, C0 denotes the marginal distribution
on cost vectors drawn from P0, and C1 the marginal distribution on cost vectors drawn from P1 (Definition
2.1); recall that these distributions are symmetric.
We now define a quantity τα,δ, which represents a cost threshold that satisfies two conditions. First, it
represents a threshold such that with high probability 1 − δ (with respect to the prior P), at least a 1 − α
fraction of individuals in the population have costs ci ≤ τα,δ. Second, it is also a threshold such that for
every player i, conditioned on seeing either the bit bi = 1 or bi = 0, the probability that a random other
agent j 6= i has cost cj ≤ τα,δ is at least 1− α.
Definition 3.2 (Threshold τα,δ.). Fix a prior P with a corresponding marginal cost distribution C, and let
τ1α,δ = infτ
(
Pr
c∼C
[|{i : ci ≤ τ}| ≥ (1− α)n] ≥ 1− δ
)
,
τ2α = infτ
(
min
(
Pr
c∼C0,j 6=i
[cj ≤ τ ], Pr
c∼C1,j 6=i
[cj ≤ τ ]
)
≥ 1− α
)
.
We define τα,δ as the larger of these two thresholds:
τ1α,δ = max(τ
1
α,δ, τ
2
α).
We present the following theorem.
Theorem 3.2. Let P be a symmetric prior over types (b, c) satisfying the condition that for every i, the
posterior distribution Pbi on (b, c)−i given bi is conditionally independent of ci. Fix a participation goal
1−α such that α < |p1−p0|2 , a privacy parameter ǫ, and the desired confidence δ on the accuracy guarantee.
If the parameter β in mechanism MP,n,α,β,ǫ is chosen to be β = ǫτα,δ/2, then:
1. The mechanismMP,n,α,β,ǫ has a symmetric Bayes Nash equilibrium consisting of threshold strategies
στα,δ/2 , where στα,δ/2(bi, ci) = bi whenever ci ≤ τα,δ/2, i.e., all agents with cost smaller than τα,δ/2
participate and truthfully report their private bit (στα,δ/2 can be arbitrary for agents with ci > τα,δ/2.)
2. In the equilibrium στα,δ/2 , the estimate p˜ computed byMP,n,α,β,ǫ is α′-accurate for α′ =
(
ln(δ/2)
ǫn + α
)
with probability at least 1− δ, where the probability is over the draw of types from P.
Remark 3.1. If we want a mechanism which is 2α accurate, it suffices to take ǫ = ln(1/δ)αn , in which case
our β parameter is set as:
β =
ln(1/δ) · τα,δ/2
αn
Proof. We first show (1), that the threshold strategies στα,δ/2 form a Bayes Nash equilibrium.
An agent i’s payoff if she participates in MP,n,α,β,ǫ is the difference between her payment πi and her
(dis)utility from her privacy loss, vi(ǫ, o). To analyze agents’ decisions in MP,n,α,β,ǫ, note first that every
agent’s payoff depends on the decisions of all other agents in two ways—the payment πi = Bc,d,ρ(p˜−i, pbˆi)
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uses the reports bˆ−i of all other agents in computing p˜−i, and the cost vi(ǫ, o) depends on o which in turn is
computed using the reports of all other agents.
Suppose all the agents other than agent i are all following a symmetric threshold strategy σj,τα,δ/2 that
results in truthful reporting of σj,τα,δ/2(bj , cj) = bj whenever cj ≤ τα,δ/2, and can result in arbitrary
behavior otherwise.
We can now consider whether the same threshold strategy σi,τα,δ/2 is a best response for player i: if it is,
then we will have shown that στα,δ/2 forms a symmetric Bayes Nash equilibrium. Assume that ci < τα,δ/2
as otherwise there is nothing to show, since the strategy does not specify agents’ actions if their cost exceeds
the threshold.
Consider agent i’s incentives, given reports bˆ−i from the remaining participants in the mechanism. Agent
i chooses her strategy from three possible options: {bi, 1−bi,⊥}—truth-telling, lying, or not participating—
by evaluating her expected utility given the strategy choices of the remaining agents, where the expectation
is over the remaining agents’ draws of bit, cost pairs (b, c)−i from P, as well as the random coin tosses in
MP,n,α,β,ǫ. Agent i has an incentive to report the truth in MP,n,α,β,ǫ if her expected payoff from reporting
bˆi = bi is at least as large as the payoff from either reporting bˆi = 1− bi or not participating.
Let S−i denote the individuals, other than i, who truthfully participate when using strategy στα,δ/2 . Note
that by the definition of στα,δ/2 we have E[|S−i|] ≥ (1− α)(n− 1), since each individual truthfully reports
with probability (over his type distribution) at least 1− α. Thus for bi ∈ {0, 1} we have
|E[p˜−i|bi]− E[pbi |bi]| ≤ α.
We first compute the payoff for truth-telling, E[Bc,d,ρ(p˜−1, pbi)|bi] − Eo∼M(bi,b−i)[vi(ǫ, o)] and show
that it is positive. Above we saw that |E[p˜−i|bi] − E[pbi |bi]| ≤ α. Thus, by our choice of c, d, ρ and
Proposition 3.2 we have that
E[Bc,d,ρ(p˜−i, pbi)|bi] ≥ β = ǫτα,δ/2.
However, we also know that for each player i, Eo∼M(bi,b−i)[vi(ǫ, o)] ≤ ǫci by the ǫ-joint differential-privacy
of the mechanism. By assumption τα,δ/2 > ci, and so it follows that truth-telling has a positive expected
payoff for agent i.
We now show that the expected payoff for lying, E[Bc,d,ρ(p˜−i, p1−bi)|bi] − Eo∼M(1−bi,b−i)[vi(ǫ, o)] is
always non-positive. Above we saw that |E[p˜−i|bi] − E[pbi |bi]| ≤ α. Thus, by our choice of c, d, ρ and
Proposition 3.2 we have that E[Bc,d,ρ(p˜−i, p1−bi)|bi] ≤ 0. The second term is non-positive, so it follows
that the payoff for lying is also non-positive.
Finally, we look at the payoff for non-participation, which is simply −Eo∼M(⊥,bˆ−i)[vi(ǫ, o)] and non-
positive by definition.
Because the utility agent i receives from for truth-telling is nonnegative, but her utility from lying or
non-participation is non-positive, she is always at least as well off truth-telling.
It remains to show (2), that with probability at least 1 − δ the mechanism is α′-accurate for α′ =(
ln(δ/2)
ǫn + α
)
-when all players play according to equilibrium στα,δ/2 . To show this, we note that error
comes from two sources: first, non-truthful behavior. However, by the definition of στα,δ/2 , we know that
with probability at least 1−δ/2, all but αn/2 people truth-tell in equilibrium: that is, except with probability
1 − δ/2, we have |
∑n
i=1 bˆi −
∑n
i=1 bi| ≤
αn
2 . The second source of error is the Laplace noise added to bˆ.
We have that Pr[|Lap(1/ǫ)| ≥ t/ǫ] = exp(−t). Hence, Pr[|bˆ − b¯| ≥ ln(δ/2)/ǫ] ≤ δ/2. Combining these
two bounds gives the claim.
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Remark 3.2. We remark that the above analysis easily extends to the case where privacy-sensitive indi-
viduals might incur disutility from the outcome o of the analyst’s computation, as well as from the use of
their data in this computation. In this case, assume that an agent’s cost ci bounds both the cost of his
privacy and the difference in the agent’s utility between any two outcomes. Because the mechanism is
ǫ private, each agent has at most ǫ influence on its outcome. Hence the cost in the outcome quality for
changing her bit (or not participating) is at most ciǫ: Eo∼M(bi,b−i)[vi(ǫ, o)] − Eo∼M(b′i,b−i)[vi(ǫ, o)] ≤
ǫ(maxo,o′ vi(ǫ, o)− vi(ǫ, o
′)) ≤ ciǫ.
3.4 An alternative model of privacy costs
In the previous sections, we have focused on a conservative model of agents’ costs for particular outcomes
and privacy which assumes only that agent costs are upper bounded by a linear function of the differen-
tial privacy guarantee. This model was proposed by [NOS12], and is the weakest assumption seen in the
differential privacy and game theory literature. In this section, we briefly consider a less-conservative, but
still well-motivated, assumption on privacy cost functions proposed by Chen et al. [CCK+13]. Under this
stronger assumption, we are able to show not only that it is possible to truthfully elicit agents’ private bits
and compute on them accurately, but that the privacy cost of doing so tends to 0 as n grows large. In fact,
because non-private peer-prediction payments can be arbitrarily rescaled, the Chen et al. model implies that
by gathering more participants, a surveyor could drive the entire cost of running our private peer prediction
mechanism to zero.7
The following assumption is designed to capture the intuition that an agent should experience low pri-
vacy cost for outcomes that would induce only a small change in a Bayesian adversary’s beliefs about her
type (see [CCK+13] for a thorough motivation).
Assumption 3.1 ([CCK+13] Privacy Cost Assumption). We assume that for any mechanism M : {0, 1}n →
O× Rn≥0 , ∀bˆ ∈ {0, 1}
n
, for all players i, o ∈ O, π−i ∈ Rn−1≥0 :
|vi(M, (o, π−i), bˆi, bˆ−i)| ≤ ci ln
(
max
b′i,b
′′
i ∈{0,1}
Pr[M(b′i, bˆ−i) = (o, π−i)]
Pr[M(b′′i , bˆ−i) = (o, π−i)]
)
.
where the probabilities are taken over the random choices of M .8
They show a useful lemma bounding the expected privacy loss of agents participating in a differentially
private computation who experience privacy costs according to this assumption:
Lemma 3.2 ([CCK+13] Composition Lemma). In settings that obey the above cost assumption, and for
mechanisms M that are ǫ-differentially private for ǫ ≤ 1, then for a player i with bit bi, ∀b−i ∈ {0, 1}n−1,
∀b′i ∈ {0, 1},
E[vi(M,M(b), bi, b−i)]− E[vi(M,M(b
′
i, b−i), bi, b−i)] ≤ 2ciǫ(e
ǫ − 1) ≤ 4ciǫ
2
With the above assumption, we can achieve an accurate Bayes-Nash equilibrium while scaling payments
down with ǫ at a rate of ǫ2, rather than linearly. As we will see, this will allow us to drive our total costs
down to zero.
7This model does not incorporate a minimum base cost of approaching each potential survey participant.
8The model proposed in [CCK+13] is somewhat more general, and allows the costs to be bounded by arbitrary functions of the
log probability ratio, not just linear functions. We adopt this linear model here for simplicity, so that we do not need to modify our
model of having a distribution of costs ci.
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We first show an analogue of Theorem 3.2. The only difference is that with our new stronger assump-
tion on agent privacy costs, we can obtain a Bayes Nash equilibrium while taking the β parameter to be
substantially smaller than before.
Theorem 3.3. Suppose agents’ privacy costs satisfy Assumption 3.1. Let P be a symmetric prior over
types (b, c) satisfying the condition that for every i, the posterior distribution Pbi on (b, c)−i given bi is
conditionally independent of ci. Fix a participation goal 1− α such that α < |p1−p0|2 , a privacy parameter
ǫ, and the desired confidence δ on the accuracy guarantee. If the parameter β of the mechanism is chosen
to be β = 4ǫ2τα,δ/2, then:
1. The mechanismMP,n,α,β,ǫ has a symmetric Bayes Nash equilibrium consisting of threshold strategies
στα,δ/2 , where στα,δ/2(bi, ci) = bi whenever ci ≤ τα,δ/2, i.e., all agents with cost smaller than τα,δ/2
participate and truthfully report their private bit (στα,δ/2 can be arbitrary for agents with ci > τα,δ/2.)
2. In the equilibrium στα,δ/2 , the estimate p˜ computed byMP,n,α,β,ǫ is α′-accurate for α′ =
(
ln(δ/2)
ǫn + α
)
with probability at least 1− δ, where the probability is over the draw of types from P.
Remark 3.3. Note that this theorem differs from our previous theorem in how it sets β. Since we can again
take ǫ = ln(1/δ)αn , we have
β =
4 ln(1/δ)2 · τα,δ/2
α2n2
Proof. We first show (1), that the threshold strategies στα,δ/2 form a Bayes Nash equilibrium.
Suppose the agents j 6= i are all following a symmetric threshold strategy σj,τα,δ/2 that results in truthful
reporting of σj,τα,δ/2(bj , cj) = bj whenever cj ≤ τα,δ/2, and can result in arbitrary behavior otherwise.
We can now consider whether the same threshold strategy σi,τα,δ/2 is a best response for player i: if it is,
then we will have shown that στα,δ/2 forms a symmetric Bayes Nash equilibrium. Assume that ci < τα,δ/2
as otherwise there is nothing to show.
An agent’s i’s payoff if she participates in MP,n,α,β,ǫ is the difference between her payment πi and her
(dis)utility from her privacy loss, vi(ǫ, o). We will first show that an agent’s utility for participating and
truth-telling is higher than her payment for participating and misrepresenting her bit.
An agent i has a higher payoff for truth-telling than for lying if:
E[Bc,d,ρ(p˜−i, pbi)|bi]− E[vi(M,M(bˆ), bˆi, bˆ−i)] ≥ E[Bc,d,ρ(p˜−i, pb1−i)|bi]− E[vi(M,M(bˆ), 1 − bˆi, bˆ−i)]
Or equivalently,
E[Bc,d,ρ(p˜−i, pbi)|bi]− E[Bc,d,ρ(p˜−i, pb1−i)|bi] ≥ E[vi(M,M(bˆ), bˆi, bˆ−i)]− E[vi(M,M(bˆ), 1− bˆi, bˆ−i)].
By Assumption 3.1 and Lemma 3.2, the right hand side of the above inequality is at most 4ciǫ2, since
the mechanism is ǫ-differentially private. It remains to bound the left-hand side.
Let S−i denote the individuals, other than i, who truthfully participate when using strategy στ . Note
that by the definition of στα,δ/2 we have E[|S−i|] ≥ (1− α)(n− 1), since each individual truthfully reports
with probability (over his type distribution) at least 1− α. Thus for bi ∈ {0, 1},
|E[p˜−i|bi]− E[pbi |bi]| ≤ α.
Above we saw that |E[p˜−i|bi]− E[pbi |bi]| ≤ α. Thus, by our choice of c, d, ρ and Proposition 3.2,
E[Bc,d,ρ(p˜−i, pbi)|bi] ≥ β = 4ǫ
2τα,δ/2.
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By assumption τα,δ/2 ≥ ci, and so if we can show that the expected payment that a player receives for
misreporting his bit is non-positive, we will be done.
We now show that the expected payoff for lying, E[Bc,d,ρ(p˜−i, p1−bi)|bi] is always non-positive. Above
we saw that |E[p˜−i|bi] − E[pbi |bi]| ≤ α. Thus, by our choice of c, d, ρ and Proposition 3.2 we have that
E[Bc,d,ρ(p˜−i, p1−bi)|bi] ≤ 0. The second term is non-positive, so it follows that the payoff for lying is also
non-positive.
We similarly must show that the utility associated with participation and truth-telling is greater than the
utility of non-participation. That is:
E[Bc,d,ρ(p˜−i, pbi)|bi]− E[vi(M,M(bˆ), bˆi, bˆ−i)] ≥ −E[vi(M,M(bˆ),⊥, bˆ−i)]
This statement follows from analysis analogous to showing that truth-telling outperforms lying, since non-
participation induces the same privacy cost as reporting bˆi = 0, but results in no payment.
It remains to show (2), that with probability at least 1 − δ the mechanism is α′-accurate for α′ =(
ln(δ/2)
ǫn + α
)
-when all players play according to equilibrium στα,δ/2 . To show this, we note that error
comes from two sources: first, non-truthful behavior. However, by the definition of στα,δ/2 , we know that
with probability at least 1−δ/2, all but αn/2 people truth-tell in equilibrium: that is, except with probability
1 − δ/2, we have |
∑n
i=1 bˆi −
∑n
i=1 bi| ≤
αn
2 . The second source of error is the Laplace noise added to bˆ.
We have that Pr[|Lap(1/ǫ)| ≥ t/ǫ] = exp(−t). Hence, Pr[|bˆ − b¯| ≥ ln(δ/2)/ǫ] ≤ δ/2. Combining these
two bounds gives the claim.
Finally, we show that the total payment that the surveyor need produce tends to zero as the population
size n grows large. In particular, this means that the marginal cost of preserving privacy while doing peer
prediction tends to zero as n grows large.
Theorem 3.4. Fix any parameters α and δ. In the symmetric Bayes Nash equilibrium defined by threshold
strategies στα,δ/2 , the total expected cost incurred by the surveyor:
n∑
i=1
E[πi] ≤
4 ln(1/δ)2 · τα,δ/2
α2n
·
(
1 + 4
α
2(p1 − p0)− 4α
)
= O
(
1
n
)
Proof. Recall that in equilibrium, players maximize their payoff by truthtelling. Therefore:
n∑
i=1
E[πi] ≤
n∑
i=1
E[Bc,d,ρ(p˜−i, pbi)|bi]
However, recall that we have shown that |E[p˜−i|bi]− E[pbi |bi]| ≤ α. Therefore, we can invoke proposition
3.2 (3) to conclude:
E[Bc,d,ρ(p˜−i, pbi)|bi] ≤ β + 4ρα|p0 − p1|
= β ·
(
1 + 4
α|p0 − p1|
2(p1 − p0)2 − 4α|p0 − p1|
)
=
4 ln(1/δ)2 · τα,δ/2
α2n2
·
(
1 + 4
α
2(p1 − p0)− 4α
)
Therefore:
n∑
i=1
E[πi] ≤
4 ln(1/δ)2 · τα,δ/2
α2n
·
(
1 + 4
α
2(p1 − p0)− 4α
)
= O
(
1
n
)
.
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4 Conclusion
In this paper we have shown how to accurately conduct a survey when agents have costs associated with
their privacy loss that might result from the survey outcome, even when the surveyor has no ability to verify
agents’ private data. This result holds under even an extremely mild assumption on agents’ privacy costs—
that they are simply upper bounded as a function of the privacy parameter ǫ when the mechanism satisfies
ǫ-differential privacy. Under a stronger, but still well-motivated assumption on privacy costs, we have fur-
ther shown that remarkably, the cost of conducting such a survey (and, in particular, the marginal cost of
compensating for privacy losses) can be driven to zero simply by increasing the number of participants.
However, compared to past literature on the sensitive surveyors problem, our results come at a price. Be-
cause we cannot verify agents’ bits, we inherit from the peer-prediction literature that truth-telling results in
just one of possibly many Bayes Nash equilibria of our mechanism. Although the truth-telling equilibrium
might be considered “focal”, and hence likely to occur given a lack of coordination by the agents, in the
presence of coordination, we might be worried that agents can collude and coordinate on a different equilib-
rium, which might result in lower privacy costs for them. The problem of eliminating these bad equilibria is
an exciting direction for future work.
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